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secularized persons are not consistently rational themselves if they dismiss 
theism as irrational only because it does not match the presuppositions of 
their own system. 
The rational effectiveness of such an apology, however, does not 
appear so impressive when one realizes that the "rationality" of a system 
does not necessarily entail its "truth." Nash is aware of this fact when he 
correctly explains that "people have in the past behaved quite rationally 
with regard to beliefs that we know to be false" (p. 75). Additionally, 
naturalism is not shown to be either "irrational" or "false." Consequently, 
the issue regarding a rational basis for choosing between theism and 
naturalism as systems seems to reach a stalemate. 
One wonders whether rational apologetics should argue for more than 
the rationality of theism as a system. An effective apologetics should 
include the "truth" dimension of the system. Nash fails at that point, yet 
his "comparison of ideological systems" approach to apologetics could 
prove to be fruitful if the issue of "truth" is integrated into that system. 
That would require Nash to develop his thinking from "faith and reason" 
to "faith and truth." According to this strategy, the opposite views to be 
considered must first be analyzed on the basis of their systematic presup- 
positions; second, be developed in their actual theoretical interpretation of 
reality as a whole; and, third, be compared regarding their "truth" on the 
basis of the verification of their theoretical claims on the meaning of 
reality with reality itself. Nash sets the stage for such a strategy in the first 
part of Faith clr Reason, but fails to carry it to its ultimate consequence as it 
relates to the "truth" dimension of the controversy between systems. Such 
an approach would require not only a critical analysis of theism's pre- 
suppositions and components (including ontological, metaphysical, and 
epistemological structures), but also should include as "the opponent" 
more than just naturalism. Several different ideological systems that cur- 
rently challenge not the rationality but the truthfulness of Christian theism 
should be considered. If followed, this approach could prove to be bene- 
ficial not only for apologetic purposes, but for a much needed self-criticism 
of theism as well. 
Despite its deficiencies, Nash's book is helpful. Anyone interested in a 
clear introduction to the current state of rational apologetics in the Re- 
formed tradition will benefit from Nash's Faith 6. Reason. 
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Clark H. Pinnock was a Calvinistic evangelical until about 1970. 
Since then he has been on a pilgrimage from "Augustine to ArminiusW- 
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an experience shared in chapter one of The Grace of God. The following 
chapters (2-15) constitute a symposium of essays on determinism versus 
free will by such scholars as Fritz Guy, I. Howard Marshall, Terry L. 
Miethe, Jack W. Cottrell, Richard Rice, William L. Craig, John E. 
Sanders, C. Stephen Evans, Randall G. Basinger, William G. Macdonald, 
William J. Abraham, Grant R. Osborne, Jerry L. Walls, and Bruce 
Reichenbach. 
While the book's title includes the phrase "A Case for Arminianism," 
the authors, generally, do not subscribe to a thoroughgoing, classical 
Arminianism. Craig suggests a Calvinist-Arminian rapprochement, Abra- 
ham encourages Calvinists and Arminians to borrow lavishly from each 
other, and Osborne prefers a modified Arminian theology that balances 
sovereignty and responsibility. However, each author begins his chapter by 
refuting the Calvinist/determinist position on a given issue before contend- 
ing for one that is free will. 
Central to the issue of determinism is the question of God's sove- 
reignty. How can God be sovereign unless His will, His knowledge, His 
justice, His love, and His grace be absolute? But piling absolute upon 
absolute results in serious paradox if not outright contradiction. Hence, 
Cottrell and Basinger call for a modified, biblical understanding of God's 
sovereign will because deterministic/absolute sovereign will leads to fatal- 
ism. Reichenbach, moreover, argues for true human freedom and moral 
responsibility (humans are more than mere animals) by denying the 
necessitarian view of divine sovereignty and asserting that man has genuine 
freedom to accept or reject God's offer of grace. 
Critical, also, to the issue of determinism is the question of God's 
character. Can God, through His foreknowledge, elect some of His crea- 
tures to be damned and still be loving and just? 
One way to deal with the divine attributes is to make one of them 
absolute and condition the others accordingly. This seems to be what 
happens when Guy considers the love of God. A loving God, as defined in 
the life and teachings of Jesus, would not will any of His creatures to be 
damned. But a loving God, by the same token, would not force any to be 
saved if they choose otherwise. Universalism may be attractive, but it is not 
biblical. 
In discussing God's grace, Marshall and Miethe argue for a universal 
or unlimited atonement because the alternative is election in the sense that 
God elects some to be deprived of His grace-a position contrary to the 
clear witness of scripture, in which God makes appeals for all mankind to 
repent and be saved. Walls seeks to show how Wesley's conditional view of 
predestination and a modified divine-command theory avoid the charge 
that God is immoral and unjust. 
But if the character of God is the Achilles heel for Calvinistic de- 
terminism, God's foreknowledge is the Achilles heel for Arminianism. 
Arminius himself did not know quite how to deal with the dilemma. - The 
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prophetic element in scripture requires divine foreknowledge, yet absolute 
foreknowledge does deny human freedom. 
Craig finds the solution in Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge, 
which is enjoying a current resurgence, but which must be somewhat 
suspect because of, among other considerations, the convoluted logic it 
requires. Rice rejects Molina's thesis ("if God's creatures have genuine 
freedom, which possible world is actualized depends on their decisions as 
well as on God's") in favor of a doctrine of divine foreknowledge which is 
inclusive except for the content of future free decisions. Concerning 
prophecy, however, Rice allows for "exceptional" acts of divine interven- 
tion. But, one might ask, does this call for "exceptional" divine judgment 
for those whose freedom has thus been violated? My sympathies, however, 
are with Rice's view. Would it be too much to say that God has selective 
foreknowledge? By insisting upon absolute divine foreknowledge do we 
deny Him freedom of choice in His sphere while requiring it for ourselves 
in ours? 
Sanders makes a critical point with respect to the whole issue ok divine 
determinism. He contends that our reading of the text of scripture is 
governed by "control beliefs." These are preconceptions about God that 
we begin with but which do not originate in scripture. This point is 
critical and needs further development. It seems obvious that the theology 
of Calvin, Luther, and others was controlled by beliefs about God that had 
their origin in Greek philosophy. There is a fundamental correlation 
between the idea of immutability and God as the unmoved mover. God is 
the source of all motion, therefore He cannot move. Since He cannot 
move, He cannot change. Hence with God there is no before or after, only 
an eternal present. The problem with all of this is that it is not scriptural, 
nor is it logically consistent (Rice-it denies God's omniscience), nor is it 
acceptable, given our present knowledge of the universe. What is change- 
less about God is His character. God is love. 
The book's strength is also its weakness. Having been written by a 
number of authors, the insights, perspectives, and perceptions are enrich- 
ing and broadening. But, quite naturally, it lacks an internal consistency. 
The writers do not agree on all points. Moreover, in arguing their case 
they are limited to one chapter. But, given their task, there is probably far 
less risk in not saying enough than in saying too much. 
The book is not, and does not intend to be, the last word on the 
subject. But it is an extremely interesting and helpful source for those 
engaged in the pursuit of knowledge on a very important issue for all 
serious Christian scholars, especially at a time when the swing is away 
from Calvinistic determinism. 
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